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LIMITING INTERSTATE COMMERCE CLAUSE
SCRUTINY -REEVES, INC. V. STAKE
"[E]very consumer may look to the free competition from every producing
area in the Nation to protect him from exploitation by any [state]."'
Courts have interpreted the commerce clause2 to restrain states' ability to
regulate interstate commerce. 3 The Supreme Court has enforced this limita-
tion on state power to keep open the free flow of commerce between the
states. 4 Under the commerce clause, the Court traditionally has applied a
balancing test to determine the validity of a state statute restricting the flow
of interstate commerce. The state justification for the barrier is weighed
against the resulting effect on interstate commerce,5 generally without re-
gard to the form or nature of the state action.' Recently, however, the
1. H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949).
2. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, el. 3 provides that Congress has the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes."
3. See e.g., Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252 (1946) (the commerce clause by itself
limits the power of the state to interfere with interstate commerce); Southern Pac. Co. v.
Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1945) (the commerce clause absent congressional legislation affords
some protection against state interference with interstate commerce). For a discussion of the
historical development of the implied restraints of the commerce clause, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTrrUTIONAL LAW 320-27 (1978) [hereinafter cited as TRIBE].
4. See, e.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 803 (1976) (commerce clause
designed to prevent state lines from becoming barriers to the flow of interstate trade); Great Ad.
& Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370 (1976) (analysis of commerce clause scrutiny
begins with the principle that free flow of trade is to be promoted among the states).
5. See, e.g., Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 379-82 (1976) (Mississippi
statute barring acceptance of out-of-state products unless seller's state accepted Mississippi
products, enacted to protect the health of Mississippi citizens, weighed against the resulting
effect of cutting off markets to businesses which could more efficiently produce the product);
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (Arizona statute requiring all cantaloupe
offered for sale to be packaged in closed containers within the state, enacted to protect the
reputation of Arizona growers, weighed against the resulting effect of forcing out-of-state
packagers to relocate within the state); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354
(1951) (Madison, Wisconsin ordinance requiring milk sold to be processed within a five mile
radius, enacted for local health reasons, weighed against the resulting effect of insulating the
milk industry from competition); H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 529-41 (1949)
(New York statute allowing denial of license for receiving plant to an out-of-state milk buyer,
enacted to protect in-state supply of milk, weighed against the resulting effect on competition).
6. International Textbook Co. v. Pigg, 217 U.S. 91, 112 (1910). See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 144-45 (1970) (state statute requiring fruit to be packaged in state
had the effect of limiting competition in interstate commerce); H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond,
336 U.S. 525, 531 (1949) (state statute designed as a health measure had the effect of protecting
local economic interests from competition); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 522-23
(1935) (any state attempt to limit competition regardless of form affects interstate commerce).
See The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HxAv. L. REv. 58, 60 (1976) [hereinafter cited as 1975
Term]. But cf. American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719 (M.D. Fla.) (statute
requiring all Florida's public printing to be done within the state upheld), aff'd mem., 409 U.S.
904 (1972). It must be noted that the Supreme Court memorandum opinion in Askew affirmed
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Court carved out an exception to the use of a balancing test when the state
affected interstate commerce through its own involvement as a market par-
ticipant.7 Although the state's market participation may have noticeably
burdened interstate commerce, the Court held that scrutiny of the state
action under a balancing test was not warranted because the state did not
erect the type of trade barriers typically forbidden by the commerce
clause.' Thus, a state acting as a market participant was allowed to limit its
market interaction to businesses within its boundaries.'
In its most recent commerce clause decision, the United States Supreme
Court applied the market participant designation to a state which had
effectively erected a total barrier to interstate commerce through its partici-
pation in the market. In Reeves, Inc. v. Stake,'0 the Court decided that
South Dakota's manufacture and sale of cement through a state owned and
operated business qualified South Dakota as a market participant. The Court
did not apply commerce clause scrutiny under the balancing test, and South
Dakota was permitted to implement a resident preference program to favor
in-state businesses." Critically, however, the Court failed to recognize that
South Dakota, by participating in the market, had not only made interstate
commerce more burdensome for out-of-state interests, but also had closed its
borders to them. 12 The Court improperly applied the market participant
designation to avoid the need to examine the consequences of state action. 1
As a result, the Court did not determine whether the participation in the
market, in fact, created the type of trade barrier that should have triggered
commerce clause scrutiny under the balancing test.' 4
BACKGROUND
Balancing Test
Application of the implied restraints of the commerce clause on state
action is based on the premise that the United States comprises a national
the state's ability to act in a proprietary manner only when acting for its own private advantage
and end use. The state must seek favorable contract terms in its proprietary activity in order to
meet the private advantage requirement and conserve government finances. By actually acquir-
ing title to and possession of the articles of interstate commerce, the state is acting for its own end
use. See id. at 721-25; Note, Constitutional Law-Commerce Clause-State Purchasing Activity
Excluded from Commerce Clause Review-Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 18 B.C. COM. &
INDUS. L. REV. 893, 908-09 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Purchasing Exclusion]. For a discussion of
the inefficient economic effect of in-state public purchasing statutes, see Note, Home-State
Preferences in Public Contracting: A Study in Economic Balkanization, 58 IOWA L. REv. 576
(1973).
7. Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 808 (1976).
8. Id. at 807-10.
9. Id. at 810.
10. 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
11. Id. at 436-40.
12. See notes 104-07 and accompanying text infra.
13. See notes 97-103 and accompanying text infra.
14. See notes 15-33 and accompanying text infra.
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marketplace. 5 State action that erects trade barriers contravenes this prem-
ise.16 Consequently, through a balancing test, the Court has traditionally
scrutinized state action limiting out-of-state businesses' access to in-state
markets. This balancing test has been uniformly applied when an out-of-
state business either sought to compete with in-state interests 7 or claimed
equal access to in-state resources.' 8 Therefore, any state restriction or regu-
lation of the interaction of private parties across state lines has been subject
to review.
Commerce clause scrutiny of state action under the balancing test consists
of a three step analysis. First, if the challenged state action evenhandedly
affects both in-state and out-of-state interests the incidental effect on inter-
state commerce is permissible.' 9 Second, if the state action treats in-state
and out-of-state businesses differently, the burden is on the out-of-state
businesses to demonstrate that state action "discriminates against interstate
commerce on its face or in practical effect." 0 The out-of-state business must
show either that the state action is purposefully designed to limit the access of
out-of-state business to in-state markets, 2 or that the practical effect of state
15. See, e.g., Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 803 (1976) (commerce clause
protects the right to participate in the national marketplace); Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370 (1976) (free trade among states is to be protected under the
commerce clause).
16. Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 527 (1935). Justice Cardozo stated that
state power does not include the ability to establish economic barriers against competition from
the products of another state. Such restrictions limit the mobility of commerce and neutralize
competitors' natural advantages. Id.
17. See, e.g., Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 138-40 (1970) (statute limiting out-
of-state fruit packagers from competing with in-state packagers); Polar Ice Cream & Creamery
Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361, 375-77 (1964) (statute limiting out-of-state milk producers from
competing with in-state producers).
18. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 332, 324-25 (1979) (statute limiting out-of-state
dealers' access to natural minnows greater than the limitations on in-state dealers); City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 622-29 (1978) (statute barring out-of-state waste
suppliers use of in-state landfill sites).
19. See, e.g., Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440, 446-49 (1946) (California statute
regulating insurance agents applied to both in-state and out-of-state agents without significant
effect on interstate commerce); Milk Control Bd. v. Eisenberg Farm Prods., 306 U.S. 346, 352-
53 (1939) (Pennsylvania statute regulating price charged by local sellers designed to regulate the
local market with only incidental effects on interstate commerce).
20. Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 336 (1979).
21. See id. at 336-38 (state statute forbidding the sale of natural minnows out-of-state
purposefully discriminates against interstate commerce); City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437
U.S. 617, 627 (1978) (New Jersey statute restricting only out-of-state waste suppliers from using
in-state landfill cites purposefully blocked the flow of interstate commerce); H.P. Hood & Sons
v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 527-38 (1949) (New York statute allowing denial of license for
receiving plant to an out-of-state milk buyer purposefully limited competition in favor of in-state
interests); Pennsylvania v. West Virgina, 262 U.S. 553, 592-97 (1923) (West Virginia statute
forbidding the exportation of natural gas to protect supply for in-state consumption was imper-
missible discrimination). With the exception of the Hood case, the challenged state action
attempted to conserve a local resource. The Court has reviewed these types of statutes regardless
of whether the resource was "natural or created." West v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S.
229, 255-56 (1911).
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action precludes in-state market interaction with out-of-state interests.
2 2
Third, once the out-of-state interest establishes discrimination, the burden
shifts to the state. The state must prove that a legitimate local purpose exists
for its action. 3 The state must then demonstrate the unavailability of any
less discriminatory alternatives to promote the local purpose. 4 Ultimately,
the court determines whether the justification for the state action outweighs
the burden imposed on interstate commerce.
2 5
22. See Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 381 (1976) (Mississippi statute
barring out-of-state products unless the seller's state accepted Mississippi products was struck
down because the statute had the effect of cutting off markets to businesses which could produce
the produce more efficiently); Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 138-44 (1970) (Arizona
statute requiring all cantaloupes offered for sale to be packaged within the state in order that the
name of the state packaging the fruit would appear on the container struck down because the
statute had the effect of economically enhancing Arizona growers' reputation at the expense of
out-of-state packagers); Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews, 375 U.S. 361, 375-77
(1964) (Florida statute forbidding the sale of certain milk grades struck down because the statute
had the effect of favoring in-state producers); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349,
354 (1951) (Madison, Wisconsin ordinance requiring any milk sold to be processed and bottled
within a five mile radius was struck down because the ordinance had the effect of protecting the
local industry from competition); Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511, 521-22 (1935)
(New York statute barring importation of milk purchased at less than the New York minimum
price struck down because the resulting effect precluded the natural advantages of out-of-state
businesses). These cases all dealt with state action that had the effect of economically protecting
in-state interests from competition.
In addition, the Court in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970), "viewed with
particular suspicion state statutes requiring business operations to be performed in the home state
that could more efficiently be performed elsewhere. Even where the State is pursuing a clearly
legitimate local interest, this particular burden on commerce has been declared to be virtually
per se illegal." Id. at 145. Bruce Church, Inc., a California company, did not have facilities to
package the fruit in Arizona and would have had to expend $200,000 to comply with the statute.
Id. at 144. See Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385 (1948) (South Carolina statute requiring all
shrimp caught off its coast to be unloaded, packaged and stamped in-state); Foster-Fountain
Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10 (1928) (Lousiana statute requiring all shrimp exported to
have the heads and shells removed within the state).
23. See Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 353 (1951) (local health ordinance
regulating milk processing); South Carolina Hwy. Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177, 189
(1938) (state safety statute regulating truck weight maximum); Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346,
349-50 (1933) (state health statute regulating the importation of cattle). Conservation of re-
sources can also be a legitimate local purpose but the restriction on the resource must be
evenhanded and not discriminate against out-of-state interests, See notes 32-33 and accompany-
ing text infra.
24. The Court found less burdensome alternatives to exist in Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v.
Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 375-78 (1976) (Mississippi could have applied its own milk inspection
standards rather than imposing a restrictive reciprocal condition), and Dean Milk Co. v. City of
Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354-55 (1951) (Madison could have sent health inspectors to milk
pasteurizing plants rather than forbid the sale of milk by out-of-state producers).
25. Hunt v. Washington Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 353-54 (1977). See Pike
v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). After the state proves a legitimate local purpose for
the statute, determination of the statute's validity is a question of degree. Id. at 142.
REEVES
The application of the balancing test was recently reaffirmed by the
Supreme Court in Hughes v. Oklahoma.2 6 In Hughes, a state statute27
prohibited the transportation of "natural minnows" for sale out-of-state. 2 A
commercial minnow dealer located out-of-state was arrested for violating the
statute. 29 Upholding the out-of-state dealer's commerce clause challenge to
the statute, the Court held that the state action failed to meet the require-
ments of the balancing test. First, the Court determined that the state action
was not evenhandedly applied because the statute did not impose the same
restrictions on in-state businesses' use of natural minnows.3 0 Next, the Court
decided that the state action purposefully discriminated against interstate
commerce because out-of-state interests were completely barred from trans-
porting natural minnows for sale out-of-state.3 1  Third, although a legiti-
mate state interest in conserving local resources was present, the Court
recognized that the state action was not the least discriminatory alternative
possible.32  Because the statute allowed sale or use of natural minnows in-
state, the Court decided that conservation goals could better be served if a
non-discriminatory alternative were instituted. 33 Consequently, the Court
held that the statute's complete bar to interstate commerce violated the
commerce clause because the state action failed under all stages of analysis.
Market Participant Exception to the Balancing Test
Although scrutiny under the commerce clause generally did not distin-
guish the form or nature of state action,3 4 an exception existed for state action
in the form of actual participation in the market. Recently, the Supreme
Court determined that the balancing test would not be applied if the state
through participation in the market merely burdened, but did not totally
restrict, interstate commerce.3 -
The Court established this "market participant exception" to the balanc-
ing test in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. 3  In Alexandria Scrap, Mary-
land had instituted a bounty program3 7 to rid the state of abandoned auto-
26. 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
27. OKLA. STAT. tit. 29, § 4-115(B) (Supp. 1978).
28. 441 U.S. at 324. The Court's review of the statute focused on natural minnows because
there was no restriction on the sale of hatchery minnows. OKLA. STAT. tit. 29, §4-115(B)(2)
(Supp. 1978).
29. 441 U.S. at 324.
30. Id. at 336-37.
31. id.
32. Id. at 337-38.
33. Id.
34. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
35. See notes 36-52 and accompanying text infra.
36. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
37. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66 1/2, §§ 5-201 to -210 (1970).
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mobiles.3 8 In order to reduce bounties paid for "hulks" 39 abandoned outside
state boundaries, 40 Maryland required title documentation for all abandoned
vehicles including hulks. 41 Maryland also required more burdensome title
documentation from out-of-state businesses. 42  Maryland's bounty program
reduced the flow of hulks supplied to out-of-state processors and increased
the supply to in-state processors. 43  Appellee challenged the program as an
impermissible burden on interstate commerce.
The Court held that Maryland's statute did not violate the commerce
clause. 44  Reasoning that the purpose of the commerce clause was to prevent
state lines from becoming trade barriers to market forces, 45 the Court de-
cided that Maryland's direct participation in the market46 did not erect any
trade barriers "of the type forbidden by the Commerce Clause. " 47  As a
result, the Court determined that the purpose of the commerce clause did not
prohibit state market participation that favored its own citizeis. 4 Alexan-
38. 426 U.S. at 796. To facilitate the purpose of the program Maryland paid a bounty to any
scrap processor who could prove title to an abandoned vehicle. Id. at 797-98.
39. "Hulks" are defined in the Maryland statute as inoperable vehicles over eight years old.
Id. at 799 n.8.
40. Id. at 804-05. Appellee, a Virginia scrap processor located in close proximity to Mary-
land, participated in the program. Id. at 799.
41. MD. ANN. CODE art. 66 1/2, §11-1002.2(0(5) (Supp. 1975).
42. The Maryland processors needed only to submit an indemnification agreement for the
bounty payment. This agreement protected the processor from any third-party claim because the
hulk supplier promised to indemnify the processor for any claim presented. These indemnifica-
tion agreements were provided as a matter of course in the business. 426 U.S. at 800-01. The
out-of-state processors, on the other hand, had to provide documentation equal to that required
for abandoned vehicles. The required documentation included a certificate of title, a certificate
vesting title from the police, a bill of sale, or a Wrecker's Certificate if a licensed wrecker. Id. at
801.
43. The Alexandria Scrap Court noted:
The [statute] did not accomplish this effect directly .... [I]t still was possible for
licensed non-Maryland processors to receive bounty-eligible hulks from unlicensed
Maryland suppliers. But because it was significantly easier for those suppliers to
obtain an enhanced price from Maryland processors, they tended to deliver inside
the State. The practical effect was substantially the same as if Maryland had
withdrawn altogether the availability of bounties on hulks delivered by unlicensed
suppliers to licensed non-Maryland processors.
Id. at 803 n.13.
44. The Court stated that Maryland's statute was not the kind of action with which the
commerce clause is concerned. Id. at 805.
45. The Court recognized that the commerce clause was based on the concept of the Nation
as "a common market in which state lines cannot be made barriers to the free flow of both raw
materials and finished goods in response to the economic laws of supply and demand." Id. at
803. See Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 370-71 (1976). In Cottrell, the
Court stated that its analysis of the challenged state action began from this historical purpose.
Id.
46. 426 U.S. at 806. The Court characterized the bounty program to be the purchasing of a
potential article of interstate commerce. Id.
47. Id. at 809-10.
48. Id. The Court left unanswered the question of whether Congress could legislate against
this type of state action under the commerce clause. The Court emphasized that its decision dealt
only with implied restraints on state action under the commerce clause. Id. at 810 n.19.
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dria Scrap recognized that the balancing test was generally used to analyze
the constitutionality of state action in the form of laws, restrictions, or
regulations that restricted or prohibited market interaction between private
parties.4 9  In Alexandria Scrap no state action of that type was involved
because the state apparently had entered the market as a purchaser to rid the
state of abandoned automobiles. The Court decided not to apply the balanc-
ing test because the state action did not prohibit or restrict the flow of
abandoned vehicles between in-state suppliers and out-of-state processors. 50
Rather, interstate commerce was burdened merely by the increased costs the
out-of-state processors had to incur to meet the title documentation require-
ments. Maryland's program never closed the border to out-of-state proces-
sors, but only rendered it financially more rewarding for suppliers to deal
with in-state businesses. 51  The Court concluded that this effect was the
product of sound business judgment between private parties. Thus, although
the state market participation burdened the flow of interstate commerce, the
absence of any state maintained trade barriers precluded the use of the
balancing test.5"
FACTS AND PROCEDURE OF REEVES
In 1919, South Dakota built a cement plant to relieve regional cement
shortages. The South Dakota Cement Commission was established to manu-
facture and distribute the cement. The state owned and operated plant was
the only cement plant in the commercial area. 3 It soon produced more than
enough cement to meet South Dakota's needs. Between 1970 and 1977 almost
half of the plant's output was purchased by out-of-state buyers. 54 In 1978,
as demand for cement increased beyond the plant's capacity,5 5 South Dakota
enforced a resident preference policy. 5 In times of cement shortage, the
A possible result of Alexandria Scrap is that states will tend to offer programs similar to those
of Maryland to insulate in-state businesses from competition. Purchasing Exclusion, supra note
6, at 925. It has been argued that the Alexandria Scrap holding is a justifiable result if the
purpose of the commerce clause is to protect only consumers and other secondary purchasers.
The result of Maryland's action to these interests was favorable. But, if competitors in other
states are also entitled to commerce clause protection, Alexandria Scrap cannot be reconciled
with the free market concept. 1975 Term, supra note 6, at 60-61.
49. 426 U.S. at 806. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 138-40 (1970); H.P. Hood
& Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 535 (1949).
50. 426 U.S. at 806-07. See note 43 and accompanying text supra.
51. The in-state processors could pay more for the hulks than the out-of-state processors
because they did not incur the increased costs of title documentation. 426 U.S. at 806.
52. The Court stated that Maryland's action did not erect the type of forbidden trade
barriers involved in previous cases because the hulks remained within the state due to market
forces. Id. at 809-10.
53. 447 U.S. at 430-32.
54. Id. at 432.
55. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 13, Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
56. The Court noted that the resident preference policy was passed by South Dakota in 1974
but had not been implemented until 1978. 447 U.S. at 433 n.3. The statutory authority by which
the Commission enforced the resident preference policy provides:
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policy allowed the Commission to supply all in-state distributors and con-
tract commitments first, with any remaining supply to be allocated on a first
come, first served basis.5 7  The shortage became so severe that no surplus
existed. 58
Reeves, Inc., a Wyoming ready-mix concrete distributor, 59 purchased
ninety-five percent of its cement needs between 1958 and 1978 from the
South Dakota plant. During the construction season of 1978, Reeves was
notified by the plant that its orders for cement could no longer be filled. 0
Reeves was forced to cut production substantially because it was not com-
mercially practicable to procure cement from other sources. 6 ' In an attack
on the resident preference policy, Reeves brought suit seeking injunctive
relief against the South Dakota Cement Commission for violating the com-
merce clause. 2
The district court6 3 permanently enjoined South Dakota from enforcing
the resident preference policy. The court reasoned that the hoarding and
confinement of a state's resources posed an impediment to interstate com-
merce and was therefore violative of the commerce clause.6 4 On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reversed. 65 Relying on
Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp.,66 the court reasoned that South Dakota
acted in a proprietary capacity as a seller of cement and could therefore
favor its own citizens.6 7 After granting Reeves' initial petition for certiorari,
the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded.68  On remand, the
court of appeals, again relying on Alexandria Scrap, held that South Dakota,
The state cement plant commission is hereby empowered and authorized to operate
the South Dakota state cement plant located at Rapid City, South Dakota, to sell the
products produced at said plant, to fix the price of such products and to determine
the manner and methods of the terms under which such products shall be sold, to
advertise such products to the public in such manner as the commission shall deem
proper, and to do all things in the operation of such plant and the sale of its products
as the commission may deem necessary or expedient to the successful operation of
said plant.
S.D. COMP. LAws ANN. § 5-17-9 (1980).
57. 447 U.S. at 432-33.
58. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 22.
59. 447 U.S. at 432. Cement is a ground mineral product that is mixed with water, sand,
gravel and stone to form concrete. Ready-mixed cement is mixed at a central location and
distributed in special trucks. Id. at 432 n.2.
60. Id. at 433.
61. Id. Reeves could not obtain another cement supply due to the prohibitive transportation
costs of obtaining it from manufacturers east of the Mississippi River. Record at 21-22, Reeves,
Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
62. 447 U.S. at 433.
63. Reeves, Inc. v. Kelley, No. 78-5060 (D.S.D. July 21, 1978).
64. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at app. 16.
65. Reeves, Inc. v. Kelley, 586 F.2d 1230 (8th Cir. 1978).
66. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
67. 586 F.2d at 1232.
68. Reeves, Inc. v. Kelley, 441 U.S. 939 (1979).
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as a market supplier, could favor its own citizens and businesses."9 The
Supreme Court thereafter granted Reeves' petition for certiorari 70 to consider
the validity of South Dakota's proprietary activity under the commerce
clause. The Court affirmed the decision of the court of appeals and held that
South Dakota's resident preference policy did not violate the commerce
clause.
7
1
THE REEVES DECISION
The Court began its analysis with a discussion of Hughes v. Alexandria
Scrap Corp. ,72 and reaffirmed that state market participation is distinguish-
able from state market regulation. 73 Having determined that South Dakota
fit the market participant label set forth in Alexandria Scrap, the Court in
Reeves reasoned that the resident preference program should not be subject
to commerce clause scrutiny under the balancing test.7 4  The Reeves Court
explained that the commerce clause was primarily aimed at taxes and regula-
tions that impede private trade.75 The Court noted there had been no
historical development under the commerce clause that would prohibit the
state itself from operating freely in the market.76 The Reeves Court deter-
69. Reeves, Inc. v. Kelley, 603 F.2d 736, 738 (8th Cir. 1979). The appeals court distin-
guished Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979), because Oklahoma's prohibition of the
shipping and sale of natural minnows was a restriction of privately owned articles of trade, not a
proprietary marketing decision. 603 F.2d at 738. On remand, the court of appeals stated that its
prior decision was not based on any state controlled natural resource. Id. at 736-37. This
determination implies the Reeves Court thought production of cement might be a natural
resource to be protected from arbitrary state control.
70. 444 U.S. 1031 (1980).
71. 447 U.S. at 440. Justice Blackmun wrote for the majority, joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Marshall, Rehnquist, and Stewart. Justice Powell wrote a dissenting opinion in
which Justices Brennan, Stevens, and White joined. Id. at 430.
72. 426 U.S. 794 (1976). The Court stated that Alexandria Scrap did not involve " 'the kind
of action with which the Commerce Clause is concerned.' " 447 U.S. at 435 (quoting Hughes v.
Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 805 (1976)). Maryland's action, according to Reeves, was
unlike prior state laws that inhibited interstate commerce because Maryland, in effect, acted as a
purchaser. Because Maryland was a market participant and not a market regulator, the Alexan-
dria Scrap Court did not require the state to justify its action. Id. at 435-36. As a result, the
Reeves Court interpreted the Alexandria Scrap rule to be that " '[n]othing in the purposes
animating the Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional action, from
participating in the market and exercising the right to favor its own citizens over others.' " Id. at
436 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 810 (1976)).
73. 447 U.S. at 436. The Court reasoned that "[t]he basic distinction between ... States as
market participants and States as market regulators makes good sense and sound law." Id.
74. The Court determined that the balancing test was not a proper means of review because
the general rule of Alexandria Scrap applied. Id. at 440. See note 72 supra.
75. 447 U.S. at 437 (citing Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 807-08 (1976),
and H.P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 539 (1949)). The Hood decision involved a
New York statute regulating the licensing of a private milk producer in New York. The Court
held that the regulation impeded private trade. 336 U.S. at 545.
76. 447 U.S. at 437. See Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 808 (1976); TRIBE,
supra note 3, at 336. Cf. American Yearbook Co. v. Askew, 339 F. Supp. 719, 720-25 (M.D. Fla.
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mined that a reasoned balancing of interests in this area would better be left
to Congress," because of the complex and competing considerations of state
sovereignty,7 8 the proprietary role of the state as guardian of its people, 79 and
the right of private business to deal with whom it pleased.8 0
1972) (statute requiring all public printing needed by Florida to be done in-state did not violate
the commerce clause), afj'd mem., 409 U.S. 904 (1972); City of Phoenix v. Superior Court, 109
Ariz. 533, 535, 514 P.2d 454, 456 (1973) (statute granting contractors who paid local taxes 5%
bid allowance was not violative of the commerce clause); Holland v. Bleigh Constr. Co., 61 111.
2d 258, 274-75, 335 N.E.2d 469, 479 (1975) (statute requiring in-state laborers be given prefer-
ence for public work projects held permissible).
77. 447 U.S. at 439. The Court explained that "as this case illustrates, the competing
considerations in cases involving state proprietary action often will be subtle, complex, politically
charged, and difficult to assess under traditional Commerce Clause analysis." Id. The Court also
recognized that the activity South Dakota was involved in was subject to congressional legislation
under the commerce clause. Id. See, e.g., National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854
n. 18 (1976) (areas not deemed to be traditional governmental activities still open to congressional
legislation under the commerce clause); New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 574 (1946)
(New York state was subject to congressional legislation under the commerce clause when it sold
mineral water from springs that the state owned and operated). Given this precedent, the Court
suggested that state proprietary activity should also be free from the implied restraints of the
commerce clause just as private businesses are. See, e.g., Collins v. Senatobia Bank Book &
Stationery Co., 115 Miss. 254, 260, 76 So. 258, 260 (1917) (state statute requiring that contracts
for books and stationery be given only to residents held valid under the commerce clause);
Tribune Printing & Binding Co. v. Barnes, 7 N.D. 591, 597, 75 N.W. 904, 906 (1898) (statute
requiring all county printing to be done within the state upheld under a commerce clause
challenge).
78. 447 U.S. at 438. In Reeves, the Court did not base its decision entirely on the market
participant exception of Alexandria Scrap. The Court asserted that judicial review of state action
which is proprietary in nature must be restrained. The Court cited as authority for this restraint
the decision in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976). In that case, the Court
held that the commerce clause did not allow federal legislation to impede traditional governmen-
tal functions. Id. at 852. The state had a right to make and structure employment relationships
in the areas of police protection, sanitation, and fire protection. "These activities are typical of
those performed by state and local governments in discharging their dual functions of adminis-
tering the public law and furnishing public services." Id. at 851. Because congressional legisla-
tion based on the commerce clause was prohibited in areas of traditional state governmental
functions, the Reeves Court concluded that judicial use of the implied restraints of the commerce
clause also were inapplicable in those traditional areas. 447 U.S. at 438 n.1O.
79. 447 U.S. at 438. In Atkin v. Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 220-24 (1903), the Court held that a
state had the right to hire employees from its citizenry without violating the commerce clause.
Id.
80. The Reeves Court stated that " 'the long recognized right of trader or manufacturer,
engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own independent discretion as to
parties with whom he will deal' " has long been recognized. 447 U.S. 438-39 (quoting United
States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919)). The Court noted that a state participating in
the marketplace has characteristics of both a political and private entity. 447 U.S. at 439 n. 12.
Cf. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 127 (1940) (the government has the power to
make needed purchases). While acknowledging that the Perkins principle was not absolute, the
Reeves Court noted that the similarities of a public entity and a private business acting in the
marketplace were significant. 447 U.S. at 439 n.12.
The Court in Reeves conceded that the market participant exception was
not absolute;8' however, it rejected Reeves' five arguments for departure
from Alexandria Scrap. First, Reeves argued that the benefits South Dakota
had received from selling the cement plant's surplus output in the interstate
market should have precluded South Dakota's ability to withdraw from the
interstate market when a shortage arose.82 The Court determined that to
accept this market exploitation claim would be tantamount to preventing the
state from dealing exclusively with its own residents from the inception of the
cement plant.83 The Court reasoned that this result was unacceptable be-
cause it would limit a state's ability to structure new relationships with its
own citizens and would thwart novel state programs designed to solve local
problems. 84  Second, Reeves claimed that the resident preference program
was designed to promote the improper protectionist objective of shielding
in-state distributors from out-of-state competition. 85 The Court determined
that South Dakota could limit the benefits of the state program because
in-state interests funded the cement plant.88  Third, Reeves argued that
cement should be classified as a protected natural resource under the com-
merce clause because the regional supply of cement was insufficient to meet
demand.8 7 Dismissing Reeves' argument, the Court explained that cement
was not a natural resource but rather the end product of a complex manufac-
turing process. South Dakota had not limited the access to raw materials
used to produce cement because out-of-state interests remained free to pur-
chase any of those materials. Accordingly, the Court concluded that South
Dakota had not impermissibly hoarded any natural resource.8 8 Fourth,
Reeves claimed that an improper competitive advantage had been given to
in-state distributors because they could resell the cement out-of-state. 8  The
81. 447 U.S. at 440. Although Reeves admitted the possibility that the market participant
exception had limits, the Court did not set forth which factors might cause it to depart from the
rule of Alexandria Scrap. See note 72 supra.
82. 447 U.S. at 440.
83. Id. at 140-41. The Court in Reeves explained that a similar argument had been presented
in Alexandria Scrap. Id. If a state could limit any benefits to out-of-state interests from the
inception of the state market activity, allowing out-of-state interests some benefits did not
preclude subsequent in-state preference. Id.
84. Id. at 441.
85. Brief for Appellant at 25, Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
86. 447 U.S. at 442.
87. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at app. 29. If South Dakota could favor its own citizens
in the sale of cement, other states could also restrict their market interaction with out-of-state
interests in similar circumstances. Id. See, e.g., Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436
U.S. 371, 385-86 (1978) (hoarding of commodities and resources would lead to retaliatory
embargoes between states).
88. 447 U.S. at 443-44.
89. Id. at ,144. The Court noted that the competitive advantage given to in-state distributors
because of their ability to resell out-of-state was a permissible result. Any premium collected by
the in-stater equated to the increased cost of purchasing through a middleman. This result
compensated South Dakota for the risk it faced building the cement plant. Id. at 444 n. 17.
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Court noted that Reeves' position necessarily implied that South Dakota's
program would have been unobjectionable if out-of-state sales from in-state
businesses were totally barred.90 In rejecting Reeves' argument, the Court
explained that such a complete bar on out-of-state sales by private businesses
would have amounted to an even greater degree of protectionism than
existed under South Dakota's resident preference program.9' Finally,
Reeves argued that because South Dakota had replaced normal free market
forces by its participation in the market, it should have acted in such a
manner as to "replicate how the free market would have operated under
[the] prevailing conditions." '  The Court dismissed this claim as South
Dakota had constructed its plant only because the private market had failed
to supply the region with cement.9 3  South Dakota could not possibly repro-
duce conditions in a market that would not have existed but for South
Dakota's own participation.9 4
In conclusion the Court stated that any force in Reeves' arguments for
reversal were offset by the possible chilling effect on future state market
activity.95 If South Dakota's program were invalidated, the Court found
unacceptable the resulting disincentive to states to institute similar projects
that provided benefits to an entire region.99
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM
The core of the Reeves holding is the determination that South Dakota's
resident preference policy fell within the purview of the market participant
90. Id. at 444-45.
91. Id. at 446. See, e.g., K.S.B. Technical Sales Corp. v. New Jersey Dist. Water Supply
Comm'n, 75 N.J. 272, 298, 381 A.2d 774, 787 (1977) (as the burden on interstate commerce
increases, commerce clause scrutiny should not decrease). The Court, in rejecting Reeves'
competitive advantage claim, attributed some of Reeves' difficulty to its not having a long term
contract with South Dakota. 447 U.S. at 445. The Court's position did not consider that Reeves
challenged South Dakota's ability to supply in-state distributors first who also did not have long
term contracts.
92. 447 U.S. at 445. Reeves argued that South Dakota's replacement of the free market
should dictate that it act as a private manufacturer and allow market forces to generate the
supply and demand for all cement distributors in the region. Id.
93. Id. at 445-46. See, e.g., Eaken v. South Dakota Cement Comm'n, 44 S.D. 268, 272, 183
N.W. 651, 652 (1921) (the private market's failure to supply an adequate amount of cement
delayed both public and private projects).
94. 447 U.S. at 446.
95. Id. The Court noted that the risks involved in state proprietary activity were not
insignificant. For example, South Dakota had lost nearly $500,000 in two similar state projects.
Id. at 446 n.19.
96. In attacking the majority decision, the dissent emphasized that the commerce clause was
designed to prevent exactly this type of economic protectionism. Id. at 447 (Powell, J., dissent-
ing). Justice Powell's definition of "protectionism" did not include the subsidy program at issue
in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794 (1976). 447 U.S. at 447 n.1 (Powell, J.,
dissenting). South Dakota's participation in the market allowed it to restrict cement sales for
public needs but should not have allowed it to restrict cement sales for the private benefit of its
own citizens and businesses.
REEVES
exception previously established in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp. 7
Moreover, the Court in Reeves reasoned that South Dakota "fit the 'market
participant' label more comfortably""8 than Maryland did in the prior deci-
sion. The Reeves Court considered Maryland's action in Alexandria Scrap to
be market participation in effect because Maryland acted as a market pur-
chaser by supplying a subsidy to in-state processors. More like a true partici-
pant, the state of South Dakota actually participated in the market, and was
the only commercially reasonable source of cement in the area. Without any
substantive analysis of the effect of South Dakota's participation on the
market, and especially on out-of-state cement purchasers, the Reeves Court
summarily concluded that "the general rule of Alexandria Scrap plainly
applie[d]."9' This determination necessarily implied that the reason for
applying the market participant exception was the same in both deci-
sions. 100 An analysis of the effect of South Dakota's participation in the
market, however, makes it clear that the Court improperly applied the
market participant exception because the basis for the exception was absent
in Reeves.
The market participant exception adopted in Alexandria Scrap was predi-
cated on two factors. First, state action must be in the form of participation
This form of protectionism that limits the access to local goods has been consistently struck
down under the commerce clause. Id. at 448. See, e.g., Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322,
336-38 (1979) (struck down statute barring sale of natural minnows out of state); Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142-44 (1970) (struck down statute barring sale of fruit outside the
state unless packaged within the state); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553, 596-98
(1923) (struck clown statute that effectively barred sale of natural gas outside the state). South
Dakota's policy contradicts the notion that the nation is the marketplace for raw materials and
finished goods. 447 U.S. at 448 (Powell, J., dissenting).
The dissent contended that South Dakota's action should be classified between the extremes
of state legislation prohibiting trade between private parties and an entirely private business
decision. Id. at 448-49. See notes 78-81 supra. The dissent, however, argued that the nature of
the governmental activity, and not the classification of it, should be determinative of the validity
of South Dakota's market participation. 447 U.S. at 449 (Powell, J., dissenting). The majority's
analysis that South Dakota should be treated as a private market participant rather than a state
regulating the market cannot be justified because a state participating in the market will respond
to political considerations. Id. at 450.
The dissent also contended that Alexandria Scrap did not apply because an impermissible
burden on interstate commerce existed in Reeves that did not exist in Alexandria Scrap. Justice
Powell maintained that the alleged burden in Alexandria Scrap was not impermissible because
market forces kept the hulks inside Maryland. Id. at 451-52. Because market forces created the
burden to the flow of goods across state lines, no forbidden trade barriers had been erected
impeding interstate commerce. Id. at 452.
In Reeves, however, South Dakota had restricted participation in the market to in-state
interests only. Id. As a result, the dissent believed that South Dakota discriminated against
out-of-state interests without justification and had created a forbidden trade barrier. Id. at
452-53.
97. 426 U.S. 794 (1976).
98. 447 U.S. at 440.
99. Id. See note 72 supra.
100. See notes 44-52 and accompanying text supra.
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in the market.'10 Second, the effect of state action must not be to erect the
type of trade barriers forbidden under the commerce clause. 2 If these two
requirements are met, the commerce clause does not require the state to
justify the resulting burden its action may produce on interstate commerce.
Nothing in the commerce clause prevents the state from favoring its own
citizens. 10
In Reeves, however, the Court determined the basis for the market partici-
pant exception by analyzing only the first factor outlined in Alexandria
Scrap. 10 4 Accordingly, the Court held that if the state action fit the market
participant label, the general rule established in Alexandria Scrap would
apply and the Court need not address the second factor. 10 5 The Court
inferred that both of the factors actually determined to be present in Alexan-
dria Scrap were also present in Reeves, without actually making such a
determination. 10 6 This conclusion is difficult to accept because the Reeves
Court never considered whether the substantive effect of South Dakota's
action did erect the type of trade barriers forbidden under the commerce
clause. 107 The Court did not analyze the substantive effect because, in fact,
such an analysis would have revealed precisely the type of prohibited trade
barrier that could not be justified under the market participant exception of
Alexandria Scrap.
In Reeves, the private market interaction was between the in-state cement
producer and the in-state or out-of-state cement distributors. The resident
preference policy implemented in 1978 changed the relationship between the
in-state producer and the out-of-state distributors. The market participants
were no longer free to interact across state lines. South Dakota's action
totally prohibited out-of-state distributors from purchasing cement from the
cement plant. 08 Unlike the state of Maryland in Alexandria Scrap, which
did not totally prohibit market interaction between in-state and out-of-state
interests, 09 South Dakota in Reeves effectively barred any market interac-
101. 426 U.S. at 806. See note 46 supra.
102. See notes 49-52 and accompanying text supra.
103. See note 48 and accompanying text supra.
104. See notes 97-99 and accompanying text supra.
105. The Reeves Court stated that its analysis consisted of "a single inquiry: whether the
challenged 'program constituted direct State participation in the market.' " 447 U.S. at 435-36
n.7.
106. In Reeves, the Court interpreted the Alexandria Scrap finding of the absence of an
impermissible burden to mean that any burdens imposed on private businesses by state market
participation were trade barriers for purposes of commerce clause review. Id. This interpreta-
tion refutes the Alexandria Scrap conclusion that no trade barriers of the type typically forbidden
by the commerce clause resulted from Maryland's participation in the market. See notes 45-52
and accompanying test supra.
107. The Reeves Court's misapplication of the Alexandria Scrap market participant exception
is supported by the Court's insistence on equating the burdens on interstate commerce due to
South Dakota's policy with barriers to trade between private parties. 447 U.S. at 435-36 n.7.
108. "South Dakota has shut off its cement sales to customers beyond its borders. That
discrimination constitutes a direct barrier to trade .. ." Id. at 453 (Powell, J., dissenting).
109. The out-of-state processors were not precluded from purchasing hulks from the in-state
suppliers. See note 43-supra.
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REEVES
tion between the out-of-state distributors and the in-state producer. 11 0 Given
this, the Court should have analyzed the resulting burden to interstate
commerce under the balancing test.
The Balancing Test Applied To Reeves
The Right of Out-of-State Business to Compete with In-State Interests
When a state erects a trade barrier between market participants, the
Court has traditionally scrutinized the justification for the state action. 1
South Dakota, by enforcing the resident preference policy, gave a competi-
tive advantage to any in-state distributor.1 2 A distributor located in-state
could purchase cement from South Dakota and then sell it outside the state.
Reeves and all other out-of-state cement distributors would not be able to
compete for that business." 3  But, if Reeves had relocated within South
Dakota, it would also have been at a competitive advantage." 4 This form of
burden that reduces the efficiency of business operations because of the need
to relocate is strictly scrutinized." 5
The Reeves Court dismissed as insignificant the competitive advantage
afforded in-state distributors. The Court stated that South Dakota could
have enforced a greater amount of protection by totally barring out-of-state
sales after 1920, thereby rendering Reeves' competitive advantage claim
unobjectionable because any sale to out-of-state businesses would be less
burdensome on interstate commerce.116  This argument assumed a vital
factor under the balancing test which the Court had not recognized in prior
cases when testing state action. Previously, the extent of the burden on
110. The Court in Reeves noted that South Dakota had not completely cut off out-of-state
distributors because they could purchase cement from other in-state distributors in the secondary
market. 447 U.S. at 444 n.17. This reasoning, however, misinterpreted the Alexandria Scrap
Court's determination of the parties which are protected from having trade barriers erected
against them. In Alexandria Scrap, the out-of-state purchaser was not precluded from purchas-
ing from the in-state supplier. See note 52 supra.
111. See notes 15-18 and accompanying text supra.
112. 447 U.S. at 444 n.17. Out-of-state buyers will pay an increased price that in-state
distributors will not pay. Id. As a result, the state action did not have an evenhanded effect on
in-state and out-of-state interests. See note 19 and accompanying text supra.
113. This result has the practical effect of discriminating against out-of-state interests. Ac-
cordingly, the second stage in the balancing test was present. See notes 20-22 and accompanying
text supra.
114. Reeves noted this result after the resident preference policy was implemented. 447 U.S.
at 445.
115. See Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142-44 (1970) (state statute requiring fruit
to be packaged in closed containers within the state forced out-of-state fruit packagers to relocate
packaging facilities in-state); Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948) (state statute requiring
all shrimp caught off its coast to be unloaded, packaged, and stamped within the state forced
out-of-state shrimp suppliers to relocate); Foster-Fountain Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 10
(1928) (state statute requiring all shrimp exported to have heads and shells removed within the
state was unjustifiable economic burden to out-of-state shrimp suppliers).
116. See note 91 supra.
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interstate commerce was scrutinized after the state erected a trade barrier
between private parties." 7 In Reeves, the Court analyzed the hypothetical
burden imposed from the inception of the cement plant in 1920. Since South
Dakota theoretically could have prohibited out-of-state sales from the begin-
ning, the Court reasoned that the sale of any cement to out-of-state busi-
nesses had a less burdensome impact on interstate commerce. Under the
Court's reasoning, the operation of the cement plant in 1920 was the barrier
to trade to which commerce clause scrutiny would be applied.,, In fact,
however, there was no trade barrier erected before 1978 because South
Dakota had not limited the right of out-of-state businesses to compete with
in-state interests. Thus, the Reeves Court's, position that no impermissible
competitive advantage was given to in-state distributors is not well founded.
The existence of the discriminatory competitive advantage should have trig-
gered the third stage of the balancing test.
After the discriminatory effect of the state action is established, the state
must prove the existence of a legitimate local purpose." 9 The Court in
Reeves decided that in-state purchasers should have the right to the cement
output first because they incurred the possible risk of loss in the cement plant
operation.120  Under the balancing test the state must also prove the absence
of less restrictive alternatives to protect the claimed local benefit.' 2 ' A
possible alternative would have been to ration the available supply to all
cement distributors. This measure would equalize the burden of the short
supply to all distributors purchasing from the cement plant.12 2  Since the
Reeves Court did not address this alternative, it can be inferred that the
Court reasoned that no less restrictive alternatives existed. In addition, the
third stage of the balancing test requires the Court to weigh the burden
imposed on interstate commerce against the state justification for the bur-
den. 2 3 The Reeves Court failed to recognize the burden imposed by the
competitive advantage given to in-state distributors; 12 4 as a result, it is
evident that if the balancing test had been applied, its requirements would
not have been met.
117. See, e.g., Great At. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366, 375 (1976) (burden
imposed on interstate commerce was measured after the Court determined Mississippi's statute
had blocked trade between out-of-state producers and in-state buyers); Dean Milk Co. v. City of
Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 355 (1951) (burden imposed by local ordinance evaluated after the
discrimination arose between in-state buyers and out-of-state sellers).
118. 447 U.S. at 444-45. The Reeves Court relied on Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137
(1970), in support of the absence of a competitive advantage for in-state distributors. In Pike,
however, the Court did not scrutinize the extent of the burden until the barrier to trade was
erected. Id. at 142-44.
119. See note 23 and accompanying text supra.
120. 447 U.S. at 446 n.19. See note 95 supra.
121. See note 24 and accompanying text supra.
122. Another alternative would be to ration the available supply to all distributors with a
premium quantity given to in-staters.
123. See note 25 and accompanying text supra.
124. See notes 111-118 and accompanying text supra.
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The Right of Out-of-State Businesses to Equal Access to In-State Natural
Resources
Under the commerce clause, the balancing test is also used to determine if
a state has impermissibly hoarded a natural resource. 2 5  The Reeves Court
sought to characterize South Dakota's resident preference policy as not in-
volving the hoarding of any natural resource. It was true that South Dakota
had not restricted the private sector's access to the materials used in cement
production. 2  Although cement is not a natural resource, 27 the South
Dakota plant, through the manufacturing process, produced a product that
was a scarce resource within its region.2 8  This circumstance in Reeves bore
a striking similarity to two prior decisions 29 which suggest that the Court
should have scrutinized Reeves' claim to equal access to the available cement
supply. In City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 30 the Court struck down New
Jersey's attempt to restrict out-of-state use of in-state landfill sites. The
discriminatory prohibition forced out-of-state interests to bear the burden of
the entire effect of the regulation.' 3 ' Similarly, Reeves and other out-of-
state distributors were forced to absorb the entire effect of the short supply of
cement in 1978. In Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 31 the Court invalidated a
West Virginia statute forcing all natural gas producers located in West
Virginia to give preference to in-state customers. In Reeves, the resident
preference policy had the same effect; South Dakota's action forced the
cement producer to give preference to all in-state customers. 113
Under the balancing test, South Dakota's resident preference policy would
have been struck down. First, the policy was not applied evenhandedly;
in-state distributors were favored.13 Second, the state action purposefully
discriminated against out-of-state businesses because they were totally
125. The reason for applying commerce clause scrutiny is to prevent states from erecting
retaliatory embargoes. Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 385-86
(1978).
126. 447 U.S. at 443-44.
127. The Reeves Court stated that coal, timber, wild animals, and minerals were natural
resources, but that cement was not. Id. at 443.
128. See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. West Virgina, 262 U.S. 553, 596-99 (1923) (natural gas
production is a resource to be protected from hoarding under the commerce clause); West v.
Kansas Natural Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229, 255-56 (1911) (same).
129. See notes 130-133 and accompanying text infra.
130. 437 U.S. 617 (1978).
131. Id. at 622-24.
132. 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
133. Justice Powell noted this result by stating that "[t]he effect on interstate trade is the same
as if the state legislature had imposed the policy on private cement producers." 447 U.S. at 453
(Powell, J., dissenting).
134. The shortage of supply was so acute that out-of-state distributors were not able to
purchase any cement from the plant. See note 58 and accompanying text supra. Cf. City of
Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978) (only out-of-state waste suppliers pre-
cluded from using in-state landfill sites).
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barred from purchasing cement from the producer. 135 Third, South Dakota
could not claim any legitimate conservation purpose because South Dakota
had not limited in-state distributors' freedom to sell cement beyond state
boundaries. 1 36
To allow South Dakota the discretion to determine who may realize the
benefits of cement production is to restrict the economic efficiency of the
national market place, 3 regardless of whether South Dakota had not re-
stricted the means to cement production. Because the cement plant was the
only manufacturer in the region, it follows that South Dakota was suffi-
ciently supplying the regional market. 138 After the resident preference pol-
icy was implemented, out-of-state buyers were forced to wait until another
manufacturer supplied the area. Once the seasonal demand diminished,
South Dakota would attempt to sell the excess output in the out-of-state
market. Similarly, in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, the state did not limit
access to the means of producing a natural gas plant. Out-of-state buyers
were not precluded from producing their own natural gas. Moreover, the
stricken statute would have forced out-of-state buyers to wait for other
natural gas suppliers to open, similar to the delay imposed on out-of-state
distributors in Reeves. These types of state action limit the efficiency of the
marketplace because state boundaries, rather than supply and demand,
become restraints on market interaction.
IMPACT
The Reeves decision set forth a new standard for judicial use of the implied
restraints of the commerce clause. Now, state market participation which
creates the same effect as state action prohibiting private market interaction
will be scrutinized under a different standard for commerce clause purposes.
In Alexandria Scrap, the state action did not require traditional commerce
clause scrutiny because the market participation created no trade barriers of
the type forbidden.139 In Reeves, even though a forbidden trade barrier had
been erected through state market participation, classification of the state as
a market participant was the determining factor which precluded commerce
clause scrutiny. 40 Consequently, the two step analysis of the market partic-
ipant exception adopted by Alexandria Scrap was reduced in Reeves to one
step. Courts will now scrutinize state action to determine if it fits the market
135. See notes 108-110 and accompanying text supra. Cf. Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262
U.S. 553, 596-98 (1923) (out-of-state natural gas buyers precluded from purchasing from in-state
producers).
136. 447 U.S. at 444.
137. 447 U.S. at 448 n.2 (Powell, J., dissenting).
138. Almost one half of the plant's output was sold to out-of-state distributors before 1978. Id.
at 432.
139. See notes 44-52 and accompanying text supra.
140. See notes 97-110 and accompanying text supra.
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participant label without determining if the underlying effect of the state
action creates a forbidden type of trade barrier. If South Dakota had prohib-
ited a private cement producer from selling to out-of-state buyers, however,
the Court would have recognized the forbidden trade barrier and applied the
balancing test.
41
The new standard adopted by Reeves precludes the application of any
balancing test to state market participation activity. In Reeves, the failure to
distinguish between forbidden trade barriers and permissible burdens result-
ing from state market activity leaves future courts without basis for com-
merce clause scrutiny under the balancing test. Courts cannot use the balanc-
ing test because the discriminatory effect of the state action was disregarded
in Reeves. The Court did not define the boundaries of the market participant
exception, but only stated that the possibility of exceptions existed. As a
result, future courts will apply a less restrictive analysis to state action in the
form of market participation because the extent of the burdens imposed upon
interstate commerce in Reeves would have been impermissible under the
balancing test. 4
2
The major impact of the Reeves decision may arise from increased state
participation in the market to protect in-state interests. If a state imposes
protectionist economic legislation on private parties, commerce clause scru-
tiny is applicable under the balancing test. Following Reeves, state partici-
pation in the market which produces the same effect is, however, immune
from commerce clause scrutiny. Under the Reeves decision, a state partici-
pating directly in the market for the manufacture, production, and sale of
new energy sources, such as oil shale or oil sand, would be able to favor
in-state interests during an energy shortage at the expense of out-of-state
interests. 43 In addition, the state could force out-of-state interests to relo-
cate in-state by differentiating the price of goods sold.144 Similarly, a state
involved in the manufacture, production, and sale of pharmaceutical goods
could determine who receives the benefit of a new life saving drug by
restricting its sale to in-state interests. 145  These extreme forms of state
protectionist policy are possible after Reeves because of the absence of any
limiting criteria to the market participant exception.
CONCLUSION
Scrutiny of state market participation is now constricted because under the
Reeves Court's analysis, the substantive effect of the state action will be
disregarded. The Court's interpretation that the form of the state action is
conclusive of whether the market participant exception applies, sets forth a
141. 447 U.S. at 453 (Powell, J., dissenting).
142. See notes 111-138 and accompanying text supra.
143. 447 U.S. at 453 n.6 (Powell, J., dissenting).
144. Purchasing Exclusion, supra note 6, at 927.
145. 447 U.S. at 453 n.6 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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less restrictive standard for state policies that protect or favor in-state inter-
ests when the state is a participant. The traditional balancing test no longer
applies because the Reeves Court rejected the basis for its application by
expanding the market participant exception. This decision shifts the focus of
recent Supreme Court cases in the area of commerce clause scrutiny from the
effect of the state action on interstate commerce to the form of state action.
This shift will allow states participating in the market to adopt policies that
promote economic balkanization. With the Reeves decision, the Court has
deferred its right to scrutinize state participation in the marketplace under
the commerce clause. The Reeves Court determined that Congress is better
equipped than the courts to evaluate the competing interests involved when a
state participates in the market.
Christopher J. Keith
